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1. Introduction 
The history of land-use changes is first of all a history of the expansion of arable 
land areas by large-scale conversion of natural into managed ecosystems. The ex- 
tent, type and rate of this transformation throughout the world is driven by 
numerous variables including: population growth, changes in level and structure 
of food consumption, the productivity of national systems of agriculture, and the 
international division of agricultural production (e.g., export crop production). 
Throughout human history population increases could only be sustained by im- 
provements of two factors: namely, enlarging the land areas devoted to agriculture 
and/or increasing the agricultural productivity per unit land area. Today, the ex- 
pansion of arable land areas is most visible in some areas of the developing world 
(see Figure 1 from Marland 1989:205). However, similar patterns of land-use 
change occurred in the northern hemisphere many decades to centuries ago. Land 
transformations are therefore not new. What is new however is that the forces of 
change are far more powerful than in the past, as reflected in the sheer size of in- 
creases in the absolute number of people inhabiting planet Earth. 
This paper addresses the role of technology (or better: of technological change) in 
this transformation process. The role of technology in changing land-use patterns 
is usually associated with images of land areas covered by human artifacts like in- 
frastructures, skylines of city centers and sprawling suburbs. The global quantita- 
tive picture however contradicts such conceptions. Although detailed statistics 
are lacking, the area covered by artifacts of our technological civilization most 
likely cover less than one percent of the Earth's land area.* In contrast, the areas 
used for agriculture and pasture cover close to 40 percent of the global land area 
(FA0 1991:47). 
The role of technology has therefore first of all to be discussed in its relationship 
to agriculture, in particular to increases in the productivity of land and labor. 
The productivity of land determines the land requirements of a given population. 
- - 
* We use a value of 250 rnl per capita for the land devoted to building areas (of course not all of them actu- 
ally covered by buildings) and infrastructures, a value typical for the most densely populated countries like 
Japan and the Netherlands. AB most regions of the world have a significantly lower population density, the 
actual percentage of land areas covered by human artifacts will be significantly below one percent of the 
Earth's land areas. 
The productivity of labor determines the percentage of this population that is re- 
quired to cultivate the land. As we will show later, technological change has 
dramatically raised agricultural labor productivity and noticeably improved agri- 
cultural land productivity. The technologies we use, and the pace by which they 
change therefore matter. Technology is important not only for affecting the 
amount of land required to feed people, but even more so for enabling ever in- 
creasing fractions of the population to engage in economic activities outside agri- 
culture and living outside rural (i.e., in urban) areas. 
1.1. What is Technology? 
Before however discussing some quantitative relations between technology and 
land-use changes we ask the question, what is technology? We define technology 
along a conceptual continuum, in fact, along a hierarchical, i.e., a "boxes-within- 
boxes" (Simon 1988:lO) kind of structure. Moving from single artifacts to more 
complex systems, technology progressively encompasses, in addition to artifacts, 
the related knowledge base and organizational and institutional settings which. 
steer the development, widespread diffusion, and different ways of use of artifacts. 
In this larger sense technology refers to whole socio-technical systems of produc- 
tion and use (Kline 1985:2-4) which enable humans to extend their capabilities 
and to accomplish tasks which they could not perform otherwise. 
In the most narrow terms, technology is represented by man-made objects, like 
manufactured articles, frequently referred to by engineers as "hardware" and by 
anthropologists as "artifacts". However, this is a limited view. In fact artifacts 
have to be produced (invented, designed and manufactured). This requires a 
larger configuration (system): hardware (e.g., machinery, a manufacturing plant), 
factor inputs (labor, energy, raw materials and other resources) and finally 
"software" (know-how, human knowledge and skills). The latter term (for which 
the French use the word technique) represents the disembodied nature of technol- 
ogy: the information, skills, procedures (organization) which are required to pro- 
duce any artifact. In economics this disembodied nature of technology is referred 
to as knowledge base. Technological change thus not only entails the creation of 
new artifacts and/or the replacement of old ones, but also involves changes in the 
related knowledge base. Finally, technique is not only required for the production 
of given artifacts but also for their use (e.g., the technique of driving a car or using 
a bank account), both at the level of the individual and at the level of a whole so- 
ciety. Forms of organization (like the existence of markets), institutions, social at- 
titudes and beliefs are important to understand how systems of production and 
use of artifacts emerge and function. They are also important determinants for 
the origin and choice (selection) mechanisms of particular (combinations of) ar- 
tifacts and the rate by which these become incorporated (or not incorporated) into 
a given socio-economic system, i.e., the process of their difiusion. 
Thus, in this paper the term technology is interpreted in a larger context: 
comprising not only man-made artifacts, (scientific) knowledge, know-how, and 
skills necessary for their inception, production and use (technical knowledge bases), 
but also a larger set of (evolving) social and organizational know-how and tech- 
niques. It is this larger socio-economic context in which technologies are embed- 
ded, and which directs the inception and diffusion of individual or whole clusters 
of artifacts. 
From a historical perspective we can conclude that the process of development, 
stimulated by changing structures of economic activities and technological change, 
in particular periods tended to cluster around (interrelated) sets of artifacts, tech- 
niques, and organizational/institutional configurations. These mutually inter- 
dependent and cross-enhancing socio-technical systems of production and use can- 
not be analyzed from the perspective of single technologies, but have to be con- 
sidered in relation to many other processes of technological, institutional and so- 
cial change. Using the concept of "techno-economic paradigms" we will discuss 
below various clusters of "technologies" (in above larger definition), and their re- 
lationship to technological change in agriculture. We then try to relate these tech- 
nological developments to land-use changes since the beginning of the 18th centu- 
ry- 
1.2. Technological Change: Concepts a n d  Theories 
There is no universally accepted theory of technological change, and even less so a 
theory of technology-environment interact ions with special reference to land-use 
changes. On a general level, one might consider that not only type and scale of 
environmental impacts but also their perception as ultimate constraints for future 
development and the preparedness and capacity for mitigation measures are not 
independent from technology. Thus, environmental consciousness itself may grow 
with higher levels of technological capability and affluence, and the factors that 
lead to technological sophisticat ion may ultimately also lead to environment a1 so- 
phistication. The latter is interpreted here not so much as conservation of en- 
vironmental resources, but as their comprehensive management, extending far 
beyond traditional end-of-pipe clean-up and repair mechanisms. 
A first necessary step to improve the environmental compatibility of human ac- 
tivities is thus the comprehensive accounting of hitherto neglected environment a1 
"externalities". Amongst others, concepts like industrial metabolism (Ayres 
1989:23-49) have been proposed to comprehensively account the material and en- 
ergy flows of industrial activities. However, technology-environment interactions 
should be described as static (e.g., in the frequently used form of fixed emission 
coefficients associated with particular industrial activities). Environmental im- 
pacts may also be alleviated through the deployment of new technologies, the in- 
troduction of which depends on both the level of technological competence 
(research and development capabilities) and appropriate policies for their 
diffusion. This two-faced aspect of technology-environmental interlinkages has 
been referred to as the "paradox of technology" (Gray 1989:192-204), which 
describes technology both as a source and a possibly remedy to environmental 
disruption. Thus, technology-environment interactions, especially from a histori- 
cal and long-term perspective, can only be captured once we recognize technology 
as dynamic, constantly reshaped by a changing economic and social environment 
into which it is embedded. 
Another theoretical approach that may be useful in describing the interface 
between technology and land-use changes, especially in agriculture, comes from 
economics. Using a production function approach (i.e., explaining the output of a 
particular economic activity in terms of required factor inputs such as labor, capi- 
tal, land, etc.) the impact of technology can be represented in both an indirect and 
a direct way. 
The indirect way would attribute output differentials which cannot be explained 
by differences in factor inputs (i.e., the unexplained residual of a production func- 
tion after accounting for traditional factor inputs) to technology (hardware and 
software). For instance, Gaspari and Millendorfer 1976:175-187 develop a gen- 
eralized production function explaining different overall macr*economic produc- 
tivity levels by different endowments and usage of traditional factor inputs. They 
then attribute remaining productivity differences to variations in technology 
coefficients (i.e., levels of technological capability), which are found to vary 
significantly among different soci*cultural settings. 
A more direct way to incorporate technology would include technological factors 
as direct inputs in a more disaggregated production function. Here, in addition to 
land, labor and capital, also fertilizer, machinery, qualifications of the workforce, 
etc. are considered to explain agricultural output, or changes in agricultural pr* 
ductivity. Technological change influences (lowers) in such a model either the in- 
put coefficients of the production function (i.e., increases factor productivity). Al- 
ternatively, technological change could result in a shift of the production function 
altogether, resulting in a radical new combination of factor inputs, or a "quantum 
leap" in the output frontier, i.e., the maximum output attainable with optimal use 
of a given set of available factor inputs. The usefulness of such an approach for 
the analysis of agricultural productivity changes was demonstrated by Hayami 
and Ruttan 1985:117-160, although data limitations do not allow use of such a de- 
tailed approach over the spatial and temporal coverage considered here. Although 
this methodological approach allows assessment of the direct impacts of technol* 
gy on productivity, it is necessarily limited to a more restricted definition of tech- 
nology. Interdependencies between technologies, and between technologies and 
techniques, (i.e., efficiency in technology application) are difficult to capture in 
production function models. For instance, the impact of fertilizers on agricultural 
productivity depends on the availability of high yield crops, availability of tran- 
sport infrastructures, level of mechanization, etc. 
Another aspect of technology is exogenous to production function models: the ori- 
gin and selection mechanisms of the particular technologies represented. There is 
a decades long debate on what are the drivers of the inception of technologies, and 
what are the mechanisms of selection among the usually large number of compet- 
ing alternatives to fulfill a particular task in the early phases of technology evolu- 
tion. Theories range at the extreme views that technologies are developed either 
out of need or out of opportunity (i.e., what in economics is referred to as 
demand-pull versus technology-push hypothesis), and that the selection mechan- 
isms operate either subject to some optimality criteria or subject to stochastic 
processes (i.e., emerge out of the cumulativeness of many small random events). 
Both theoretical and empirical approaches have been developed to corroborate ei- 
ther hypothesis and further discussion of this important aspect is beyond the 
scope of this paper. What is however important for the present discussion is to 
emphasize the heterogeneity among technological options, their assessment (cri- 
teria) by economic agents, and in their appropriability conditions, which emerges 
from both theoretical and empirical research streams on this issue. Technologies, 
their selection criteria and adoption environments thus differ in space and time. 
This heterogeneity and diversity in the early phases of technology development 
appears almost as a prerequisite for the longer-term viability of technologies. 
Limited variance in technological options (and resulting experimentation) can lead 
to limited success (e.g., nuclear energy) or to complete failure (e.g., zeppelins). 
Here we follow a more inductive approach without any particular strong theory 
bias, concentrating on a quantitative account of changes in agricultural land and 
labor productivity (without however, attempting a formalization along the lines of 
a production function approach). These changes in agricultural productivity are 
then related to a qualitative discussion of important technological transforma- 
tions. Some illustrative examples of technological change particularly in agricul- 
ture will be discussed also in quantitative terms, without however implying that 
agricultural productivity changes can be reduced to the diffusion of individual 
technologies in the sense of singular artifacts. Instead, we use these examples 
rather as indicators of larger systems of technology consisting of whole clusters of 
interrelated artifacts, and institutional and organizational innovations. 
The inductive approach adopted aims in particular to preserve potential 
"surprisesn that the data may contain, as reflected for instance in the long-term 
stability of some of the structural transition paths identified, their historical path 
dependency (Arthur 1988:592-599) between different regions as a result of 
different resource endowments (e.g., the relative availability of land versus labor 
in agriculture), as well as soci+cultural differences (for instance, dietary 
differences), and the resulting only conditional convergence at  the international 
level. Such stable transition paths appear sustained rather than broken-up by the 
succession of various technological clusters over time, but can for the time being 
not be explained through a formal theoretical model of technological change and 
its relationship to long-term economic growth and changes in land use. 
1.3. Technology and Land-use Changes 
How does technological change in form of the succession of various techn* 
economic clusters identified in our analysis relate to changes in land-use patterns? 
First, technological change led to far-reaching transformations in agriculture 
through increases in land productivity (i.e., Udecouplingn the expansion of agricul- 
tural areas from population growth) and increases in labor productivity (i.e., free- 
ing people for other economic activities and enabling urbanization). 
Second, in particular the successive utransport revolutions" increased the spatial 
division of labor, enabled the expansion of large-scale export-oriented production 
and trade and the increasing population concentration in urban areas. Perhaps 
the most pervasive changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution are a 
result of the large-scale development of transportation systems of increasing spa- 
tial density and productivity allowing to cover ever larger distances (Figure 2) at 
lower costs. 
Third, new transport technologies increased the physical access to land and its use 
in a geographical sense. Distance can be expressed as physical distance, or meas- 
ured in hours of travel time (functional distance). New transport technologies re- 
duced distance and connected ever larger territories into functionally interconnect- 
ed systems. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that even agriculture to- 
day operates as a world-system. 
Throughout history, the technological level and the dynamics of its change have 
and continue to be spatially heterogeneous. In fact, it is only over the last 50 
years that technologies have become truly global. And it is also only during this 
time that agricultural land productivity increases have outpaced the rate of popu- 
lation growth. If the world's population in 1980 would have been supplied by the 
same productivity levels as prevailed in 1950, the arable land area would have 
been 500 million ha above the actual value of around 1500 million ha in 1980. It 
is our contention that the key factor of such developments is technological change. 
However, the nature of technological change as a process of cumulativeness and 
historical path dependency requires that we look back to the origins of a series of 
technological transformations: the Industrial Revolution. 
2. Technological Clusters Since t h e  Industrial  Revolution 
In the 18th century, a series of innovations (most notably the spinning jenny, the 
flying shuttle and the power loom) transformed the manufacture of cotton in Eng- 
land and gave rise to what eventually became a new mode of production: the fac- 
tory system. Innovations in the fields of energy (stationary steam engines) and 
metallurgy (replacement of charcoal by coal in the iron industry) were of a similar 
revolutionary character, and all these, mutually reinforcing one another, drove an 
industrial revolution in Britain, making her the world's leading industrial and 
economic power well into the late 19th century. Technology embodied in 
machinery, leading to new forms of production, products and markets has been, as 
Mokyr (1990) says, "he lever of riches". 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to list, let alone to discuss, the large number 
of innovations involved in the take-off of the Industrial Revolution. Landes 
1969:41 summarizes them under three principles: the substitution of machines for 
human effort and skill; the substitution of fossil fuels (coal) for animate power 
opening for the first time in human history the possibility of unprecedented con- 
sumption density and almost unlimited supply of energy; and the use of new (and 
more abundant) raw materials in manufacturing. These three principles not only 
apply to the onset of the Industrial Revolution, but also to later stages in the in- 
dustrialization process. Today, they also apply to the modernization and econom- 
ic growth in developing countries. 
Important technological innovations can also be identified in earlier periods of hu- 
man history. The special characteristics of the Industrial Revolution is the bun- 
dling and mutual cross-enhancing of many individual innovations, and their 
embedding in profound transformations of the social and organizational fabric of 
society. The steam engine, the coal industry, railroads, and new steel production 
processes cannot in fact be considered separately: they depended on each other, 
enhanced each other and together via a multitude, of what in economics is re- 
ferred to as forward and backward linkages, contributed to economic growth. The 
same can be said about the internal combustion engine, the oil and petrochemical 
industries, synthetic fibers and plastics to name just a few areas associated with 
the post WW I1 period of economic growth. 
Of equal importance were and are social and organizational changes which span 
the whole domain from the generation of (scientific) knowledge, its systematic de- 
ployment in the innovat ion process, incentives for innovat ion diffusion, new modes 
of production, enterprises, organization of market relations, and so on. In their 
analysis of "how the West grew richn, Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) emphasize 
therefore the decisive role of new institutional arrangements such as the early 
separation of the political and economic spheres. 
Cameron 1989:163-182 cautions against the terminology of an "Industrial Revolu- 
tion" with its implicit concept of a pronounced discontinuity and emphasis on in- 
dustrial technology and innovation. He emphasizes that changes were not only in- 
dustrial, but also social and intellectual, commercial, financial, agricultural and 
even political. In this "seamless webn of historical change it is difficult to assign 
relative weights to different factors, or to ignore the importance of earlier develop- 
ments of proto-industrial economies as driving forces and causes of change. 
Perhaps the intellectual and institutional/organizational changes were the most 
fundamental, in that they provided an environment favorable for systematic ex- 
perimentation (creation) and commercial application (diffusion) of innovations. In 
this sense, changes in the social context may be seen as the fundamental driving 
force of change, as permitting and encouraging changes in the fields of industrial 
technology, products, markets, infrastructures, etc. 
From such a perspective, a central characteristic of the period of economic expan- 
sion since the 18th century is the "bundlingn of whole clusters of technological and 
organizational innovations. Thus, the impact (e.g., on GDP growth) of any indi- 
vidual technological innovation, as important in its own merits it may be (such as 
the railways of the 19th century), is necessarily limited. Instead, it is the synergis- 
tic interlinkages with other technological and organizational innovations that have 
resulted in the profound transformations of economic, employment and social 
structures over the last 300 years. 
Freeman and Perez 1988:38-66 refer to such clusters of interrelated technological, 
institutional and organizational innovations as "techno-economic paradigmsn. 
Table 1 illustrates five such technological clusters. It gives the dominant techno- 
economic systems for each epoch in the top row, and the emerging ones in the 
middle row. The last row summarizes the predominant organizational and 
management models during the respective periods. 
Table 1. Clusters of Pervasive Technologies. 
1750-1820 1800-1870 1850-1940 1920-2000 1980- 
Dominant Syhna~: 
Water Power, Coal, Railways, Electricity, Gas, nuclear, 
sails, canals, steam ships, oil, cars,roads aircraft, 
turnpikes, iron, steam heavy industry, telephone, telecomm., 
iron castings, power, steel, radio, TV, information, 
textiles mechanical coal chemicals, durables, . phote 
equipment telegraph, petrochemicals electronics 
urban infra. 
Emerging S y k m :  
Mechanical Steel, Electricity, Nuclear power, Biotech., 
equipment, city gas, cars, trucks, computers, artificial 
coal, sta- coal chemicals, roads, gas, tele- intelligence, 
tionary steam telegraph, radio, telephone, communication, space industry 
canals railways, oil, aircraft & transport 
urban infra. petrochemicals 
Organisational Style: 
Manufacture Factory Standard- Fordism- Quality 
system ization Taylorism control 
The list of clusters in Table 1 is of course not exhaustive, and also the timing is 
necessarily approximate. However, it provides an account of important clusters of 
pervasive technologies and infrastructures and their changes, which are to a large 
extent drivers of the history of economic growth, the spatial division of labor, 
changes in employment, and to some extent also of the environmental impacts as- 
sociated with the development of particular technological regimes. 
From a historical perspective, we can conclude that the development (diffusion) of 
such technology clusters is an international phenomenon, but with great spatial 
disparities. The development of particular systems is initiated in a number of 
core countries, from which they spread out further via a series of spatial hierar- 
chies to (spatially or economically) peripheral areas (Figure 3). Also adoption 
starts much later, the latter tend to "catch upn with the core countries, albeit at 
significantly lower levels of adoption intensity. 
For instance, the construction of the railway networks of England and the USA 
spans a period of 100 years (1830-1930), whereas it took typically only half that 
time in Scandinavia (1870-1930). Railway networks were also most extensive (in 
either per capita or unit land area terms) in the countries (England and the USA) 
that were leading the introduction of this technology than in follower countries 
(Figure 4). Altogether, the core areas of railway development (England, Europe, 
and the United States) had constructed about 60 percent of the 1.3 million km 
railway network worldwide by 1930 (Table 2). 
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Table 2. The Growth of Railway Networks (km). 
Important territorial changes thereafter. 
1) Data source: Mitchell 1980:609-616, and Mothes 1950:85-104. 
2) Density aa calculated by Woytinsky 1927:38-39, except Russia and the USSR (own calcula- 
tion). Range of figures for Russia corresponds to total density and the European part of the ter- 
ritory respectively. Density figures for USSR are for the 1986 network size. 
Country 
Austria-Hungary 
France 
Germany 
Russia 
USSR 
UK 
USA 
Core Countries 
Rest of the World 
WORLD 
The length of the world railway network has not increased since. Net additions to 
the railway network (primarily in developing countries) have been balanced by 
decommissioning* of railway lines (due to the development of newer transport sys- 
tems) in the core countries. This implies that the pervasive development of par- 
ticular infrastructures and technologies is time dependent. High application densi- 
ties as realized in the leading countries are unlikely to be repeated by follower 
countries at later periods in history. From this perspective, the present different 
settlement patterns, road densities and high car ownership rates in the USA are 
not necessarily a guide for future developments in other countries. By 1930, over 
20 million cars were registered in the USA (close to 90 percent of the global car 
population), which corresponds to a car ownership rate of about 200 cars per 1000 
inhabitants. This compares to a present value in Japan of 240 cars per 1000. 
Length 
by 1870 
1000 km 
6.1 
15.5 
21.5 
10.7 
- 
21.6 
85.0 
160.4 
69.5 
221.9 
Introduction 
Year 
1837 
1828 
1835 
1845 
- 
1825 
1829 
- 
- 
- 
In dealing with individual countries there is a large heterogeneity in adoption lev- 
els of technologies. The leading countries in the introduction of particular systems 
achieve the highest intensities, while "laggardsn often shift to newer "techno- 
economic paradigmsn before high adoption levels are realized. This means that 
the application of individual technologies has a different history depending on 
whether leading or lagging countries are considered. At the world level, however, 
* Ekamples of infrastructure decay processes can be found in some sectors such as transport (canals, rail- 
waya) and telecommunication (telegraph), whereas in other sectors (e.g., urban infrastructures) older aya- 
tem may be continually upgraded and used. 
Maximum 
Length 
Achieved 
1000 km 
23.0~ 
42.6 
63.4* 
70.2* 
145.6 
32.8 
482.7 
715.0 
540.0 
1255.0 
Maximum 
Length 
year1) 
1913* 
1933 
1913* 
1913* 
1986 
1928 
1929 
1930 
 ensi it^^) 
Length in 1923 
2 per loo km 
8.0 
9.7 
12.2 
0.3-1.5 
0.7 
16.0 
4.3 
2.0 
0.6 
1 .O 
per 10,000 
Inhabitants 
10.2 
13.7 
9.6 
4.8-8.4 
5.5 
8.8 
38.1 
16.7 
3.7 
6.7 
there is a broad succession from older to newer "technc+economic paradigms" as 
illustrated in Table 1. 
Let us take the development of transport systems as an example of this historical 
process of technological transitions: from canals to railways, to roads, and finally 
to airways (cf. Figure 2 above). The spread of these transport systems was per- 
vasive in the sense that they were and are important to all branches of the econ* 
my and to nearly every aspect of daily life. In this sense transport (like energy) 
systems can serve as an "indicator" of the whole techn*economic cluster they are 
associated with. Furthermore, one can easily identify the leading countries where 
the spread of each respective technc+economic cluster was most important, e.g., 
for the period up to 1820, England (early canal development); for the period 
1820-1870, England, France and the USA (pervasive canal construction, and be- 
ginning of railway development); for the period 1870-1930, the European coun- 
tries and the USA (pervasive railway development); and finally for the period up 
to the present the pervasive spread of road infrastructures and of the internal 
combustion engine in the OECD countries (cars), and in the USSR and many 
developing countries (buses). As shown below (Figure 22), the dominance of a 
particular country or group of countries in the development and resulting applica- 
tion intensity of each of these successive transportation systems is mirrored also in 
their respective intensity of urbanization. 
The transition from one cluster to the next can be identified through pronounced 
discontinuities in the social and economic spheres: increased price volatility, 
mergers and bankruptcies, and the large-scale disinvestment away from old tech- 
nologies and infrastructures. The transit ion, although disruptive, becomes neces- 
sary when the dominant cluster starts portraying decreasing marginal returns, 
generally decreasing improvement possibilities and increasing awareness of ad- 
verse social and environmental impacts associated with further expansion. Its 
further intensification in the leading countries and diffusion to peripheral regions 
becomes blocked. For the latter, opportunities open in such transitional phases 
for the introduction of new systems and technologies (Griibler and Nowotny, 
1990). On the other hand, countries with pervasive adoption of the previous.clus- 
ter face considerable transition problems due to the heavy commitments of capital 
stock and human resources in the previous technc+economic cluster. Thus, fre- 
quently, the transition from one cluster to another also changes the "club" of lead- 
ing countries. 
3. Impacts on Agriculture and Rural and Urban Populations 
3.1. Agricultural Land and Labor Productivity Increases 
Let us now examine the impacts of the successive technc+economic clusters on 
agriculture. Figure 5 presents estimates of agricultural land productivity in terms 
of the number of the population of a given region divided by the cropland area. 
The land-use estimates underlying Figure 5 (Richards 1990:164) are only first ord- 
er approximations. Differences in land productivity reflect different agricultural 
systems and differences in the stages of agricultural development which can even 
be observed today. More than 200 million people still apply the simplest mode of 
agricultural production (shifting cultivation) with land requirements of between 
15-20 ha for feeding one person. On the other extreme there are areas where 
three crops per year are grown and less than one-twentieth of a hectare produces 
enough food for one person (Buringh and Dudal 1987:12). Therefore, the regional 
aggregates of Figure 5 mask persistent differences between and within particular 
regions. For instance, the land productivity figures of Japan* are significantly 
higher than the Asian average over the whole time period considered. In a similar 
way, the land productivity figures for France* are below the European average 
throughout the period considered in Figure 5 (cf. also Figure 7 below). Our crude 
productivity measure also does not include the recently significant inter-regional 
trade in agricultural products which would increase the land productivity figures 
of net export regions (cf. Figure 6 below). 
Still, Figure 5 illustrates clearly the spatial heterogeneity in agricultural land pro- 
ductivity and its evolution since the 18th century. Differences in initial condi- 
tions, development paths pursued, in the mix of agricultural products produced, 
and dietary differences explain much of the large discrepancies in agricultural land 
productivity such as between "ricen and "grainn (and meat) oriented agricultural 
systems. With the exception of modest productivity increases in Europe and 
perhaps South America (where data are much less certain), agricultural land pro- 
ductivity did not increase in the 18th and 19th century, which implies that over 
this time period there is a direct one to one correlation between population in- 
creases and land-use changes towards agricultural land. Increases in agricultural 
land productivity become noticeable in Europe by the second half of the 19th cen- 
tury, and in all other regions by the second half of the 20th century primarily in 
conjunction with the introduction of man-made fertilizers and the diffusion of high 
yield crops. 
In contrast, agricultural labor productivity measured in total population per head 
of the agricultural workforce (Figure 6) has increased continuously since the onset 
of the Industrial Revolution (note in particular the semi-logarithmic scale of Fig- 
ure 6). These developments took place first in England, but the other industrial- 
ized countries (with the exception of France) followed in the 19th century. Consid- 
ering the significant export of agricultural products, e.g., in the USA, labor pro- 
ductivity is even higher (as indicated by the alternative data series for the USA in 
Figure 6). Similar more recent transformations in the employment structure in 
the 20th century such as in the USSR and Japan were achieved at an even faster 
pace, so the overall trend is one of convergence in the employment structure with 
only a few percent of the active population employed in the agricultural sector.* 
* Land productivity figurer for Japan exceeded 8 people per ha arable land already in the 18th and 19th cen- 
tury and currently exceed 20 peoplefha (Grigg 1980:265). Valuer for France did not exceed 1.5 people per 
ha cultivated land (excluding pastures) throughout the 18th century and well into the 19208 Grigg 
1980:198-203) compared to valuer between 3 and 4 for England and Wales over the name time period Grigg 
1980:165-177). I 
* This is of course partly also a definitional question. Many activities, previously performed in the agricul- 
tural rector, now employ people in the industrial and rervice rector. Hence, the percentage of the workforce 
for all food-related activities (farming, production of tractors, food processing and distribution, etc.) is 
significantly above the few percent of the workforce that remained on the farms. 
In many developing countries such as China and India, about 70 percent of the 
workforce is still employed in agriculture, but similar structural shifts are very 
likely to occur in the future. The experience from the developed countries and 
their temporal variation (i.e., acceleration of rates of change over time) can serve 
as a guide to derive scenarios about the future pace of this structural transition in 
developing countries. 
Above outlined tendencies in increases in agricultural land and labor productivity 
since 1700 are corroborated by shorter-term analysis of agricultural productivity 
increases from Hayami and Ruttan 1985:121-131 (Figure 7). Shorter, linear vec- 
tors indicate the changes in agricultural land and labor productivity (constant 
monetary output per unit factor input) between 1960 and 1980. For the USA, 
Denmark, France and Japan also longer-term productivity trajectories between 
1880 and 1980 are given. Values in parenthesis refer to the percent of the work 
force employed outside agriculture and thus mirror the impact of improvements in 
agricultural labor productivity on structural changes in employment. Hayami and 
Ruttan 1985:124 identify three clusters of productivity increase trajectories: an 
"Asian", "European" and "New Continental" path respectively which are related 
to the relative endowment (or scarcity) of land and labor with initial starting 
values around 1,000, 10,000 and 100,000 ha per agricultural worker respectively. 
Thus, initial conditions and specific development paths followed as a result of re- 
gional variations determine the extent and type of agricultural productivity 
changes and concomittant changes in land-use patterns. Figure 7 therefore pro- 
vides yet another illustration of the concept of historical path dependency (Arthur 
1988:85-97) developed within the framework of evolutionary models in economics. 
3.1.1. The importance of initial conditions 
To understand the large differences in agricultural land productivity prevailing 
prior to the Industrial Revolution between Asia and Europe a longer historical 
perspective is useful. By 1100, China had an estimated population of about 100 
million people, i.e., a population density of about 25 inhabitants per km2, a value 
reached in Europe only some 600 years later. 
Conversely, Europe's population in the 11th century was about 30 million 
(McEvedy and  ones 1978:19), or less than 7 people per km2. Agriculture was 
practised with long fallow periods and a corresponding low level of agricultural 
productivity. Typically, fields did not yield more than 3 to 5 (in exceptional har- 
vests 6 to 7) times the seed sown (Slicher van Bath 1963:15). 
Europe's population increased by over a factor of 3 to about 100 million with a 
population density of about 20 inhabitants per km2 by the end of the 17th centu- 
ry. This expansion of both population and agriculture was however far from a 
smooth continuous process. Due to plagues and wars fluctuations in population 
levels resulted in many ups and downs of agricultural output and land use (Abel, 
1980). Overall, the population increase, together with the emergence of the 
medieval city and an urban bourgeoisie was made possible by a large number of 
innovations in agriculture, transportation and energy. 
Although these innovations reduced physical toil and improved labor productivity, 
yields per unit of arable land remained modest. However, population densities 
were low and large virgin forest areas constituted the resource for increases in 
agricultural output. Consequently, expanding populations caused large-scale 
conversion from forests to agricultural areas between the l l t h  and 15th century in 
Europe. These were the result of both inward colonization (as the case in France, 
or England) as well as outwards colonization (as the case in Germany). Figure 8 
illustrates this eastward move in the German settlement areas especially between 
the l l t h  and the 14th century into low population density areas inhabited by 
Slavic peoples. Agricultural settlements on cleared forest areas can be recognized 
even today in many parts of Europe by particular settlement and land-use pat- 
terns (for instance by the "Waldhufenflur" in Germany and Austria, cf. Figure 9 
below). 
The shaded areas in Figure 8 indicate remaining virgin forest areas and swamps 
by 1400, illustrating that with the exception of the Carpathian and higher altitude 
alpine areas, the forests in Sweden and Lithuania, and the Pripjet swamps, much 
of the original European forest cover had already disappeared by that date (cf. 
Figure 10 below). These large-scale transformations were only temporarily halted 
or reversed. Depopulated by the Black Death or wars large land areas and 
thousands of villages were abandoned (s~cal led "Wiistungen") in the Middle 
Ages (Abel 1956:52), only to be recolonized at later periods. Thus, throughout the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, the Europeans "behaved towards their forests 
in an eminently parasitic and extremely wasteful way" (Cipolla 1976:112). Many 
areas in Europe such as the maquis of southern France, the barren areas of Cen- 
tral Spain and the eroded coastlines of the Adriatic denuded by the Venetian 
ship-building industry are testimony of the profound changes brought about by 
the deforestation of Europe after the 10th century (Figure lo) ,  which preceded 
similar developments in other parts of the globe at  later periods or even at present 
(cf. Woodwell, 1990). 
Despite perennial labor constraints on expansion of agricultural production, labor 
productivity was such that only between 10 and 20 percent of the 17th century 
European population could engage in activities outside agriculture. Agricultural 
land supported just above one person (and two draught animal*) per hectare ar- 
able land. The widespread disappearance of forests by the 17th century resulted 
particularly in England in "timber famines", with rapidly rising energy prices 
(charcoal prices tripled in the period 1630 to 1690) with many attempts to intrw 
duce substitutes (coal). Land became finally the limiting factor to population 
growth as exemplified in the work of Malthus with his pessimistic vision of the fu- 
ture that agricultural productivity increases would "fall short, beyond all com- 
parisons, of the natural increase of populationn (quoted in Glass 1953:140). 
By 1600, China had a population of similar order of magnitude to Europe (about 
150 million people). However, its agricultural productivity fed 15 people per hec- 
tare cultivated land, far exceeding even present European land productivity levels. 
'Inventories of the 16th century in England indicate an average farm sire of about 30 sown acres and an 
average population of 27 draught animals per farm (Langdon 1986:208). 
For the purpose of analyzing land-use changes the agricultural sector of China is 
of special interest. Internal colonization, first to the South and later back- 
migration to the North (Perkins and Yusuf 1984:48) opened up additional land 
areas for cultivation. Nevertheless, agricultural land availability was the principle 
constraint to increases in agricultural output. As a result China developed a 
specific agricultural system characterized by labor-intensive, high intensity rice 
cultivation with corresponding high yields per hectare. In such an agricultural 
system not only technological innovations are of importance but also social and 
organizational ones. Wet field rice cultivation required sophisticated civil (ter- 
raced fields) and hydraulic engineering (dams, locks, water storages, etc.) allowing 
the draining and irrigation of lands. Gates, pumps, and water-raising devices 
(nor ia )  controlled the flow of water. The scale of these water control projects re- 
quired the elaborate organizational skills of a "hydraulic civilizationn to use a 
term of Wittfogel (1957). Perkins 1969:61 reports that more than 50,000 projects 
can be identified in various government gazetters. Of the 5,000 water control pro- 
jects, whose construction can be dated, 94 percent were constructed between the 
10th and 19th century. Social organization, in conjunction with an elaborate tran- 
sport system, enabled effective relief of food shortages. The related administrative 
techniques were written down in legal documents (cf. Yates 1990:164-165). 
Agricultural technology was also important. Centuries before Europe the scratch 
plow was replaced by the iron plow, also adopted for wetfield rice cultivation. 
Seed drills for sowing and many other tools were introduced after the turn of the 
millennium. The use of a variety of fertilizers (urban refuse, lime, ash), of insect 
and pest control (e.g., the use of copper sulfates as insecticides) was widespread. 
Mokyr 1990:209 highlights yet another feature of Chinese agriculture: the large 
number of texts and handbooks published dealing with agricultural technology. 
furthering the diffusion of advanced agricultural techniques. 
Thus, by contrasting the much longer historical evolution of agricultural systems 
in Europe and China, their decisive different initial conditions at the onset of the 
Industrial Revolution can be better.understood. These differences in turn deter- 
mine to a large extent the differences in the development paths followed and the 
resulting land-use changes that went along with population growth over the last 
300 years. Any analysis of the impacts of technological change on agriculture and 
the resulting land-use changes has therefore to differentiate between broad 
categories of agricultural starting conditions and subsequent development trajec- 
tories followed. "Asiann, 'Europeann and "New Continentaln development paths 
have to be considered separately especially with respect to their different land pro- 
ductivity and resulting land-use patterns. 
3.1.2. Technology and agricultural productivity increases 
What were the technological changes responsible for the changes in agricultural 
labor and land productivity? We can differentiate three periods of agricultural 
change, each corresponding to particular combinations of factors responsible for 
productivity increases and to particular group of countries in which these develop- 
ment took place. Consistent with the larger definition of technology/technique in- 
troduced above we consider in addition to technological/mechanical innovations 
(tractors, man-made fertilizers, etc.) also biological (new crops from other con- 
tinents, new high-yield varieties), and social/organizational innovations (e.g., land 
reforms) of importance for agricultural productivity growth. 
The first phase (Uagriculturd innovations") lasted until the second half of the 19th 
century and consisted of the widespread diffusion of new species and agricultural 
techniques in the form of staple foods and crops, crop rotational patterns and a 
host of institutional innovations affecting operational practices in agriculture. 
Starting in England, these innovations gradually were adopted in other European 
countries to a varying degree and with different rates. The second phase (umer- 
cantilistic agriculture ") spans approximately the period from the mid-19th century 
to the 1930s. In this phase the agricultural practices and biological innovations 
introduced earlier in England and some European countries were introduced in 
other regions (e.g., in France). Industrial innovations (first mechanization, phos- 
phate fertilizer, etc.) started to be introduced into agriculture. More important, 
however, were the developments in transportation technologies expanding world 
trade in agricultural products (food and raw materials) and enabling large-scale 
export-oriented crop production (grains, cotton, rubber, sugarcane, coffee, tea, 
etc.) for export to industrialized core regions. Finally, the third phase ( Kindustti- 
alization of agriculture") can be characterized by the widespread application of in- 
dustrial innovations in agriculture, in particular mechanization, man-made factor 
inputs (fertilizer), and new high-yield plant varieties developed through agricul- 
tural R&D efforts. These developments started around the turn of the century in 
Europe and North America, and following WW I1 became global phenomena. Be- 
fore however discussing in more detail these three phases of technological change 
in agriculture and its impact on land-use changes, we summarize below some ord- 
ers of magnitude of land-use and population changes for world regions over the 
last 300 years. 
3.2. Agricultural Land-use Changes 
Table 9 summarizes changes in global land use (derived from Richards 1990:164) 
and population (Demeny 1990:42, and McEvedy and Jones, 1978) since 1700. The 
data uncertain and more indicative of the direction of change than highly accurate 
assessments of land-use figures in particular periods. 
By 1980 some 5 billion ha (38%) were covered by forests, close to 7 billion ha 
(51%) by grassland, and 1.5 billion ha (11%) by croplands. This presents a 
snapshot of a continuing long-term transformation process in land-use patterns 
that accompanied population growth since 1700: the large-scale conversion of 
forested areas to cropland. Over this period global forests decreased by close to 
1.2 billion ha, with an equal expansion of cropland. Because of the preponderance 
of developing countries in population growth they dominate land-use transforma- 
tions both in absolute and in relative (percentage) terms. Current developing 
countries account for three-quarters of population growth since 1700 and about 
the same percentage of the area deforested, and for about 60 percent of the in- 
creases in cropland area. Asia accounts for over half of the population growth in 
the 1700-1980 period with the share of other regions ranging between 7 and 10 
percent. Deforested areas are largest in Africa and Latin America (-300 million 
ha) followed by Asia and the USSR & Oceania with -250 and -218 lo6 ha, respec- 
tively. 
The expansion of cropland is much more evenly distributed among regions. 
Changes have been largest in Asia (+313 lo6 ha between 1700 and 1980), followed 
by Africa and the USSR & Oceania with +265 and +253 lo6 ha, respectively. 
Cropland areas increased by 200 lo6 ha in North America and by 135 lo6 ha in 
Latin America. Changes in Europe were comparatively small (+70 lo6 ha). 
Table 3 illustrates significant differences between regions with respect to the im- 
pacts of population growth on agricultural land-use changes. Whereas Asia ac- 
counts for 57 percent of the population growth between 1700 to 1980, it accounts 
for only 25 percent of net additions to cropland areas over the same time period. 
On the other extreme the USSR and Oceania account for only 7 percent of world 
population growth but for 20 percent of net additions of cropland. In order to il- 
lustrate the different land intensiveness of the "Asian", "European" and "New 
Continental" development paths we use the data of Table 3 to calculate marginal 
land-use changes, i.e., changes in land use per unit change of population for a 
number of reference periods (Table 4) .  The marginal land-use changes per capita 
population growth illustrate the differences in the three agricultural development 
paths discussed above. They serve also as reference points to quantify the im- 
pacts of technology (i.e., of agricultural land productivity increases) and the im- 
pacts of drawing particular regions into the international division of agricultural 
production (i.e., land-use changes due to large-scale export-oriented production). 
Table 4 shows that for each individual added to the world's population since 1700, 
on average 3,000 m2 forests were converted to agricultural land, almost exclusively 
cropland. However, there exists large temporal and spatial variation. We assume 
a value of about 2,000 m2 per additional capita to be a characteristic value for an 
Asian-type agricultural development path. For a European-type path, we assume 
a marginal land-use change value of 5,000 m2 and for a "New Continental" type 
agriculture a value of between 10,000 and 20,000 m2 per capita additional popula- 
tion. Above values are only indicative. They serve as a reference point to esti- 
mate what the changes in arable land in different regions would have been in the 
absence of technological change and external trade. Values above the reference 
marginal land-use change figures indicate that expansion of agricultural land far 
exceeded population growth. For instance, the expansion of cropland largely ex- 
ceeded population growth in the USSR & Oceania and in Asia in the period 
185G1920 (cf. Figure 1 above), indicating large-scale land conversion for export 
crop production. Latin America in the period 1920 to 1950 provides another ex- 
ample. Conversely, values below the reference marginal land-use change values, 
and especially declining values compared to previous time periods, indicate im- 
proving land productivity levels as a result of technological change. Europe since 
1850, North America since 1920, and all regions after 1950 illustrate the effects of 
technology on agricultural land productivity, progressively decoupling land-use 
Note: Nrt  land conversion m a y  no1 add due t o  rounding errors. 
% of 
Total Global 
1700-1800 1800-1850 1850-1920 1920-1950 1950-1980 1700-1980 Change 
Europe 
Forests -15 -10 -5 - 1 +13 -18 2 
Grassland -15 -25 -1 1 -3 +2 -52 - 
Cropland +30 +35 +15 +5 -15 + 70 6 
Population +53 +63 + 105 + 79 +92 +392 10 
N. America 
Forests -6 -39 -27 -5 +3 -74 6 
Grassland 0 -1 -103 -22 + 1 -125 - 
Cropland +6 +41 +I29 +27 -3 +200 16 
Population +3 +20 +89 +52 +82 +246 7 
USSR & Oceania 
Forests -29 -42 -86 -38 -23 -218 19 
Grassland +2 +7 -12 -9 -22 -34 - 
Cropland +27 +35 +97 +47 +47 +253 20 
Population +19 +30 +62 +SO +95 +256 7 
Africa & 
Middle East 
Forests -1 1 -1 5 -68 -96 -118 -308 27 
Grassland 0 +5 +23 +24 -9 +43 - 
Cropland +11 +9 +47 +71 +I27 +265 2 1 
Population o/+ 1 +4 +39 + 70 +250 +364 10 
L. America 
Forests -6 -19 -5 1 -96 -122 -294 25 
Grassland +2 +11 +25 +54 +67 +I59 - 
Cropland + 4 + 7 +27 +42 +55 +I35 11 
Population +9 +15 +67 +63 +200 +354 9 
Asia 
Forests -38 -20 -50 -53 -89 -250 22 
Grassland -1 -8 -1 1 -12 -3 1 -63 - 
Cropland $38 +29 +61 +65 +I20 +313 25 
Population + 195 +I71 +216 +372 + 1190 +2144 57 
World 
Forests -105 -145 -287 -289 -336 -1162 100 
Grassland -12 -11 -89 +32 +8 -72 - 
Cropland +I16 +I56 +376 +257 +331 +I236 100 
Population +278 +603 +578 +686 + 1909 +3755 100 
1980 
Land Use k 
Population % o f  World 
212 4 
138 2 
137 9 
484 11 
942 19 
790 12 
203 14 
248 6 
1187 23 
1673 25 
291 19 
288 7 
1088 22 
2218 33 
3 29 22 
4 70 11 
1151 23 
767 11 
142 9 
364 8 
4 73 9 
1202 18 
399 2 7 
2579 58 
5053 100 
6788 100 
1501 100 
4433 100 
















































